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FAIRNESS IN TEACHING 
ADVOCACY 
Charles W. Joiner* 
The questions I address are these: Is fairness related to advo-
cacy? Is fairness a concept that law teachers should address in 
their teaching, in particular in courses involving advocacy? By 
"courses involving advocacy" I mean courses that teach both law 
and practice techniques involving the direct protection of the 
rights of clients, particularly in the courts-for example, civil 
and criminal procedure and evidence. 
I will first define what appears to me to be what society ex-
pects from those who teach. Ours is a civilized society; we live by 
rules. Some rules express minimum standards of acceptable be-
havior. The minimum standard rules are codified in statutes, 
regulations, codes of conduct, or constitute the common law. 
These minimum standards _are usually expressly agreed upon re-
finements based upon the commonly transmitted moral values. 
They state express standards which, if violated, will result in 
punishment or some other adverse result. Other rules express as-
pirations and desires, what we hope behavior will be-goals for 
which we strive. These latter rules arise from a broad-based con-
sensus. Sometimes this consensus is found in religious tomes 
such as the Bible or the Koran. Sometimes it is based on philo-
sophical writings and broad principles of conduct. 
Both the minimum rules of conduct and the rules that mirror 
our aspirational goals have foundations in the ideas and con-
cepts handed down from generation to generation as a part of 
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the common learning of society. In addition to families, schools 
and their teachers are the major organized institutions that 
transmit an understanding of both the minimum rules and the 
ideals and aspirations we hold for our society. We learn not only 
how to avoid trouble but also how to value things. We learn 
what is good, what is better. We learn this in relation to the 
values others hold in our society. 
Society on the whole and individuals within society generally 
try to improve. Our goal seems to be to reach toward the aspira-
tions as society understands them and to raise the minimum 
standards. This goal applies to all aspects of conduct, i.e., con-
duct concerning property, wealth or poverty, individual freedom, 
or relationships with one another. In other words, each genera-
tion is attempting to improve on what its predecessors have 
done. I suggest that improvement generally means moving the 
express rules of conduct closer and closer to those standards 
that society has defined as its aspirations. Teachers are inti-
mately involved in this process. 
Is FAIRNESS RELATED TO ADVOCACY? 
Fairness has two meanings as applied to the legal system. 
First, does the decision correspond to the result society expects 
through application of the defined minimum standard-does the 
result comply with the law? For example, is it fair, in western 
society, to cut off someone's hand who has committed a theft? 
Most of us in this country would not find this to be a fair result. 
It does not accord with any of our generally accepted standards. 
A second sense of fairness applies to the procedure used to 
reach the decision. Is the procedure used one that society, with 
its minimum standards and its goals and aspirations, considers 
appropriate? Is it a procedure that enables our adversary system 
to reach the truth? 
I intentionally inject into this discussion the concept of truth 
because, among all our underlying values, we have indicated in 
many different ways that we want our decisions based on the 
truth. First, our procedures permit broad discovery of facts to 
discover truth. Second, we condemn perjury. Third, we condemn 
fraud and chicanery. Fourth, we require witnesses to state that 
they will "tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 
truth." All of this suggests that truth in the fact-finding process 
is a strong and fundamental underlying premise of our society. 
Our society urges that the court, in its efforts to resolve dis-
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putes, should try to arrive at solutions that accord with the 
truth. 
It seems to me, however, that fairness involves more than a 
process to reach the truth. It also involves the concepts of expe-
dition and economy. Society expects that the process we substi-
tute for sticks and clubs to resolve disputes should be accom-
plished rapidly and without undue expense. Society expects this 
process to work effectively; it does not want the prize to go to 
the person who can keep the process from working. Fairness in 
trials, to me, means application, economically and without un-
due delay, of a process to search out facts that leads to decisions 
that accord with truth. From everything I know about us, we do 
not want a process that resolves disputes based on false informa-
tion and half-truths. We want results as close to whole truth as 
possible. Nor do we want a process that will not come to a solu-
tion until the clients are in the poorhouse or are old and de-
crepit. Society could put the question: "Will the process or pro-
cedure give those involved the opportunity to sort out the facts 
quickly and inexpensively and reach the truth?" 
A caveat is necessary at this point. A criminal trial presents a 
different problem. Society has accepted a different goal in a 
criminal than in a civil trial. In the criminal trial we modify our 
fundamental definition of fairness with two specific require-
ments that affect the search for the truth. First, the government 
must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Second, the defen-
dant is not required to testify. These special rules express soci-
ety's greater goal of never subjecting an innocent person to pun-
ishment for a crime. The fear that the government, with all its 
resources, could easily, albeit inadvertently, convict an innocent 
person, lies behind the reasonable doubt standard. This stan-
dard embodies society's concern for one particular truth to the 
detriment of all others. 
Each of these constitutionally protected rights is so well-de-
veloped and engrained in our societal approach to the protection 
of the individual that we must modify the definition of fairness. 
Fairness in the criminal trial requires not a search for abstract 
truth but a search for an artificial truth expressed by the reason-
able doubt standard. A criminal trial seeks not to determine 
whether the fact is "A or B," or whether "D" mailed the threat-
ening letter, which would be a real search for truth, as would 
occur in a civil action. A criminal trial involves a decision about 
whether "government" has shown the fact to be "A" beyond a 
reasonable doubt, or whether the prosecutor has proved the 
mailing of the threat beyond a reasonable doubt. This process is 
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not a real search for the truth at all, but a higher artificial stan-
dard established to prevent innocent persons from being found 
guilty of a crime. In addition, in criminal trials we do not require 
that all the evidence be used. The defendant cannot be forced to 
give evidence. We require the decision maker to sort out the 
facts to determine if the defendant has been proven guilty be-
yond a reasonable doubt, without the defendant's evidence if the 
defendant decides not to testify. 
Because we, as a people, accept this artificial standard of fair-
ness in a criminal case, the lawyer's tactics in an adversary sys-
tem must be judged against that standard rather than against 
the standard of a truth-seeking process applied to a civil action. 
The civil trial, on the other hand, involves a determination of 
which side predominates; the defendant wins if both sides ap-
pear equal to the decision maker. This can fairly be classified as 
an honest search for the truth, and I believe that this is the way 
in which all of my friends and neighbors think about it. In the 
civil case, therefore, fairness involves a process designed to pro-
vide the opportunity to sort out the facts and reach the truth. 
Fairness in the criminal case, however, does not differ from 
the civil case with regard to expedition and economy. In the 
criminal case we expect both that persons will not wait a long 
time to have their guilt determined and that the prosecution will 
proceed economically. We reject the concept that persons 
charged with crime should lose because of delay, and we do not 
believe that those who can indefinitely postpone proceedings 
should, because of that fact, be declared the winners. 
Although the criminal trial differs from the civil trial in some 
aspects, the following discussion of truth-seeking, expedition, 
and economy applies to both types of trials. 
How do I test whether the adversary process we use in the 
civil case is fair by the standards of truth-seeking, expedition 
and economy? I am not an empirical researcher. My response to 
this question comes from the seat of my pants, a seat that has 
become quite glossy from sitting on the bench for more than 
twelve years, watching all kinds of lawyers try all kinds of cases. 
Advocacy in the adversary system can and does powerfully in-
fluence the search for the truth. A few examples illustrate this 
point. People temporize. People dissemble. People tell only par-
tial truths. People lie. The fact that each side of a lawsuit has a 
champion aids in the search for truth. The tool of cross-exami-
nation uncovers the truth. The combined efforts of lawyers on 
each side working diligently for their clients will, I am sure, find 
more facts in total than would one impartial inquisitor. 
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But cross-examination is sometimes abused and witnesses, 
without reason, are subjected to abusive and factually unsup-
ported innuendo. Examiners create issues out of irrelevancies, is-
sues that could mislead juries. Even if one side discovers facts, if 
that side dissembles or tries to hide the facts from the other, 
truth will likely not be reached. 
Lawyers use many tactics, in the name of what they call the 
adversary process, that impede the search for the truth, cause 
delay, and add costs. Lawyers occasionally hide facts and en-
courage clients not to disclose facts fully. Lawyers direct atten-
tion away from controlling facts on which their client is weak 
and toward non-controlling facts where he is strong-"throwing 
chaff in the air to get in the eyes of the jury." Lawyers delay. 
Lawyers of the economically strong have been known to increase 
pretrial costs to drive the economically weak out of the legal 
marketplace. Lawyers have brought suits to force settlements. 
Lawyers more than occasionally take depositions to increase 
costs to the other side and force settlement. Advocacy some-
times subverts the process of finding facts expeditiously and 
inexpensively and sometimes diverts the search for the truth. 
Lawyers respond that, "We do only what the law allows." 
That may be true in some cases; in others it is not. Even when 
lawyers remain within the minimum standards of the law they 
may subvert the process. Do advocates who merely comply with 
the minimum standards of the law meet our expectations in this 
society? Are those who do not commit perjury, who do not bribe, 
who do not violate any of the many criminal statutes on the 
books, who do not directly violate any one of the canons of pro-
fessional responsibility, but who increase costs through excessive 
discovery to drive an opponent to settle, who bring suits without 
merit in hopes of a small settlement, or who direct juries away 
from the truth, the kind of lawyers that society wants to run our 
finely tuned dispute resolving system? Is conduct that skates 
along the borderline of the criminal or unethical, conduct that 
accords with our version of how the fact-finding process should 
work? Does advocacy of this sort support a process that will 
reach the truth? 
Clearly not. This kind of action subverts the process. Society 
looks foolish. Individual clients do not receive decisions in ac-
cordance with the truth. They may never get a decision because 
of delay or cost. They win because they have retained an abuser 
of the adversary system. We used to have words for this type of 
conduct: "mouthpiece," "shyster," "pettifogger." I am not sure 
they are appropriate today. If they are not proper in today's cli-
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mate that discourages ethnic references, we should invent a new 
name that would not condemn the advocate who uses the system 
to uncover truth efficiently but would condemn the person who, 
in the name of advocacy, attempts to win cases by trick, delay, 
or the richness of his or her pocketbook. 
FAIRNESS AND TEACHING 
How does all this relate to my second question: "Is fairness a 
concept which law teachers should address in connection with 
their teaching, in particular in courses involving advocacy?" A 
law teacher must relate to the society in which he or she lives. 
Such a teacher has an obligation to try to understand society's 
aspirations and to relay to students both those aspirations and 
society's minimum standards. These aspirations should be com-
municated to students within discussions of how lawsuits should 
be tried. 
In other areas of the law, teachers have always analyzed and 
communicated society's aspirations. In torts, for example, the 
law teachers were in the vanguard of those who critically evalu-
ated the doctrine · of contributory negligence, because they be-
lieved that society really did not accept the effect of this doc-
trine, even though it had been the law for more than one 
hundred years. Law teachers wrote and taught that other doc-
trines (comparative negligence, no fault) ought to be considered 
as substitutes. Lawyers, judges, and legislators finally became 
convinced of the shortcomings of this doctrine and its harshness 
has largely disappeared. Fairness came to this aspect of tort law 
in part through the efforts of law teachers. 
In the field of contracts, largely through law teachers' writing 
and class discussions, a new way of enforcing understandings 
was developed-the theory of promissory estoppel. Law teachers 
became convinced that society was willing to accept such ideas. 
Those teachers taught students who became advocates and 
judges who applied the doctrine of promissory estoppel. 
In criminal law, law teachers criticized many statutes creating 
status crimes and defining as crimes many acts between con-
senting individuals in private. These teachers believed that soci-
ety really did not want such activity to be criminal. Largely as a 
result of the law teachers' efforts to articulate what they be-
lieved society desired, lawyers, judges, and legislators acted, 
modifying such laws. 
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In the field of criminal procedure, law teachers have been pre-
eminent in communicating what they believed to be society's as-
pirations and goals. Their teaching and argument helped de-
velop fairness in the conduct of a criminal trial. As a result of 
this teaching, judges required persons charged with crime to be 
told about their rights, to have the right to counsel, to be tried 
on evidence not seized as a result of an illegal search, etc. 
Law teachers have values. And law teachers have always used 
their sense of values to influence the legal system for the better. 
Good law teachers have always attempted to improve the mini-
mum standards to make them more in accord with what the 
teachers perceive to be the aspirations of society. 
Teachers of courses affecting advocacy should discuss the 
types of tactics that advocates use, to make certain that stu-
dents understand which of these tactics promote the search for 
the truth and which subvert it, which tactics impede expedition 
of trial, and which tactics increase costs and delay. If it is true 
that the role of the advocate is to assist in the expeditious 
search for truth, it seems important, to me, that law teachers 
devise ways of conveying this assessment to students. 
Specifically, by way of example, students need to be taught 
that clients are not entitled to use the tactics of delay. Nor are 
they entitled to wear out the other side economically. Students 
need to be shown that the discovery process must be approached 
with the same attitude of fairness I have suggested for the trial. 
Ninety-three percent of all cases never get to trial. Unfairness 
causes far more harm in pretrial discovery proceedings than it 
does during trial. 
When law teachers attempt to shape attitudes toward fairness 
and cooperation, students go into the real world supported by 
the perspectives of a distinguished mentor as they represent cli-
ents when they assist the court in finding the truth, and when 
they attempt to be fair and to oppose tactics that impede the 
search for truth. 
Some students and perhaps some teachers might respond to 
this plea with a concern that such advocates will not be hired, 
will not win, will lose to the person who subverts the fact-finding 
process and diverts the attention of the fact finder from the real 
issues of the case. This is not true. The best advocates that I 
have seen in my court are the advocates who help the jury and 
the judge ascertain the truth. They cooperate with each other in 
the pretrial discovery proceedings and during the trial. They do 
not try to eliminate one party because of lack of funds. They do 
not take extra depositions or abuse discovery. They cooperate 
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with the court. 
Many lawyers want to control abuses of the advocacy system. 
Some time ago I attended a major conference on discovery 
abuse. This conference was not sponsored by judges; it was 
sponsored by the lawyers directly involved in trying lawsuits. 
The conference urged the courts to step in and help lawyers pre-
vent discovery abuse. At this conference I again observed that 
the kind of lawyers who win lawsuits and understand the true 
meaning of the adversary system are striving to find ways to pre-
vent others from abusing the process in the name of advocacy. 
The law, too, is developing in ways that raise the minimum 
standards of conduct toward the aspirational goal of truth seek-
ing. The recent amendments to the civil rules for the federal 
courts expand the view of the pretrial and trial as a search for 
the truth. The rules promote disclosure prior to trial and at-
tempt to control costs and delay. Lawyers are required to certify 
that, after reasonable inquiry, the pleading or motion is well-
grounded in fact and law and is not interposed for improper 
purposes such as harassment, delay or increased costs. Judges 
conduct pretrial conferences to guide the search for the truth 
before the trial to prevent some problems resulting from a non-
refereed discovery system. The conference should expedite cases, 
discourage wasteful actions, improve trial preparation, eliminate 
frivolous claims and defenses, identify witnesses, identify docu-
ments, develop stipulations, and require an outline of detailed 
steps to be taken at the trial to prevent surprise. 
The thrust of the new federal rules of civil procedure, al-
though of substantive value, are more valuable as a signal to the 
bar that a substantial shift has occurred in the thinking of the 
managers of the adversary system, a shift away from the criti-
cized tactics and toward tactics that will lead to a search for 
truth. 
CONCLUSION 
To conclude, two levels of rules govern all aspects of our con-
duct. Some rules create minimum standards. Other rules iden-
tify what is good, excellent, or best. These latter rules mirror the 
goals to which we aspire. This discussion has focused on rules 
that reflect aspirations, that I think society desires, but that the 
profession has not yet been able to define as the minimum re-
quired conduct. 
Tort teachers, contract teachers, constitutional law teachers, 
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and criminal law teachers do not aim to turn out lawyers who 
merely meet minimum standards. They strive for the best law-
yers as they interpret what is best for society. Teachers of advo-
cacy should do no less. This suggests to me that a much greater 
effort should be made to develop lawyers able to hold their 
heads high and say proudly, as a result of their own individual 
actions: 
I am in a profession that searches for the truth. My client 
is entitled to have his case heard on all of the facts, not 
just those favorable to my client. I am here to see that 
this search for the truth is done quickly and without un-
due expense. I cannot be hired to obstruct or subvert this 
search for the truth. I will cooperate with the court and 
my opponents in that search. 
Fairness must be addressed in teaching courses involving 
advocacy. 

